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Large-scale quantum communication networks are still a huge challenge due to the rate-distance
limit of quantum key distribution (QKD). Recently, twin-field (TF) QKD has been proposed to
overcome this limit. Here, we prove that coherent-state-based TF-QKD is a time-reversed entangle-
ment protocol, where the entanglement generation is realized with entanglement swapping operation
via an entangled coherent state measurement. We propose a coherent-state-based TF-QKD with
optimal secret key rate under symmetric and asymmetric channels by using coherent state and cat
state coding. Furthermore, we show that our protocol can be converted to all recent coherent-state-
based TF-QKD protocols by using our security proof. By using the entanglement purification with
two-way classical communication, we improve the transmission distance of all coherent-state-based
TF-QKD protocols.
Since the first quantum key distribution (QKD) exper-
iment with 32 cm free-space channel [1], a lot of efforts
have been devoted to achieving long-distance QKD. Re-
cently, the maximum distance of point-to-point QKD has
been pushed up to 421 km ultralow-loss fiber [2]. Sev-
eral experiments show that quantum-limited measure-
ment [3, 4] and QKD [5] can be demonstrated by us-
ing satellite-to-ground downlink with more than 1000 km
free-space channel. Furthermore, measurement-device-
independent (MDI) QKD [6] has been performed over
404 km ultralow-loss fiber [7] by using the optimal four-
intensity set [8], which is immune to any attack on de-
tection [9] by exploiting the Bell state measurement.
Further increasing the fiber-based transmission distance
without quantum repeater is a difficult obstacle to over-
come. In the literature, without the help of trusted relay
or quantum repeater, people believe that the limit is ap-
proximately 500 km fiber [10]. The strong evidence comes
from the secret key agreement capacity of repeaterless
quantum channel [11, 12], where the optimal rate is lin-
ear scaling with the transmittance of two communication
parties, known as the repeaterless bound [12].
A breakthrough called twin-field (TF) QKD [13] has
been proposed to break this bound, resulting in many
variants [14–22] and experimental demonstrations [23–
26]. However, each security proof of the coherent-state-
based TF-QKD [14, 18–20], or called phase-matching
QKD, is carefully tailored. Cat state, superposition of
coherent states with two opposite phases, as an impor-
tant resource, has been widely used for quantum infor-
mation processing, including quantum computation [27],
quantum teleportation [28], quantum repeater [29, 30],
QKD [31] and quantum metrology [32]. Importantly, cat
states have been successfully generated and exploited to
demonstrate various quantum tasks [33–37].
Here, we point out the physics in coherent-state-based
TF-QKD is exactly entanglement swapping operation via
the entangled coherent state (ECS) measurement. The
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coherent-state-based TF-QKD is a time-reversed entan-
glement protocol by using ECS measurement, which is
similar with the MDI-QKD by using the Bell state mea-
surement. We propose a coherent-state-based TF-QKD
protocol under symmetric and asymmetric channels by
using coherent state and cat state coding. The entangle-
ment purification with one-way [38, 39] and two-way [40]
classical communication techniques are used to prove the
security of our protocol against coherent attacks in the
asymptotic regime. The secret key rate of our protocol is
larger than Refs. [14, 18, 19]. Furthermore, we show that
our protocol can be converted to other coherent-state-
based protocols [14, 18–20] by using our security proof,
which means that all coherent-state-based TF-QKD can
be unified under a single framework. We consider the
TF-QKD with two-way classical communication, which
significantly improves the transmission distance of all
coherent-state-based TF-QKD protocols with large mis-
alignment.
RESULTS
ECS measurement. Generally, the symmetric beam
splitter (BS) and single-photon detectors are used to im-
plement the interference measurement of TF-QKD [13].
One can assume that the two inputs of BS are a and
b modes while the two output modes are a˜ = (a +
b)/
√
2 and b˜ = (a − b)/√2. The four two-mode ECS
forms [41, 42] are |Φ±〉 = (|α〉 |α〉 ± |−α〉 |−α〉) /√N±
and |Ψ±〉 = (|α〉 |−α〉 ± |−α〉 |α〉) /√N±, where N± =
2(1±e−4µ) are the normalization factors and µ = |±α|2 is
the intensity of coherent states |±α〉. The four ECSs are
sometimes called quasi-Bell states. The quantum states
|±α〉 constitute the quasi-computational basis while the
quantum states |ξ±(α)〉 = (|α〉 ± |−α〉)/√2 constitute
the quasi-dual basis. After passing through the lossless
symmetric BS, the four states become
|Φ+〉ab
BS−−→ |even〉a˜ |0〉b˜ , |Φ−〉ab
BS−−→ |odd〉a˜ |0〉b˜ ,
|Ψ+〉ab
BS−−→ |0〉a˜ |even〉b˜ , |Ψ−〉ab
BS−−→ |0〉a˜ |odd〉b˜ ,
(1)
2FIG. 1. The coherent-state-based TF-QKD with coherent
state and cat state coding. Alice (Bob) randomly prepares
coherent states |±αa(b)〉 and cat states |ξ
±(αa(b))〉 if choosing
the Z and X bases, respectively. Alice and Bob use the inse-
cure channels ηa and ηb to send the optical pulses to untrusted
Charlie, who is supposed to perform the ECS measurement
on the two incoming pulses. Only L (R) detector click means
a successful measurement outcome |Φ−〉 (|Ψ−〉). The case of
µaηa = µbηb is required to keep perfect interference in the
Z basis, where intensity µa(b) = |αa(b)|
2 and ηa(b) is the effi-
ciency between Alice (Bob) and Charlie.
where |even〉a˜ (|odd〉a˜) means that the output mode a˜
contains even (odd) photon numbers. If we consider
the case of ideal photon-number-resolving detector and
lossless channel, one can unambiguously discriminate the
four ECSs by performing photon-number parity measure-
ment.
For the case of lossy channel and threshold detector,
one can only discriminate the case with or without de-
tector clicks. Generally, a successful detection event in
TF-QKD [13] is defined that one and only one detector
clicks. Therefore, we make only detector L (R) clicking
represent that the result of the ECS measurement is the
state |Φ−〉 (|Ψ−〉). Due to decoherence of the cat states
in lossy channel, the states |Φ+〉 and |Ψ+〉 will always be
mistakenly measured as quantum states |Φ−〉 and |Ψ−〉,
respectively. However, the corresponding probabilities
can be restricted to be very low when the optical inten-
sity is low and there is no eavesdropper’s disturbance.
The post-selected joint quantum states of two legitimate
users have quantum correlations, which then means that
coherent-state-based TF-QKD have MDI characteristic.
TF-QKD with cat state. We introduce a coherent-
state-based TF-QKD with coherent state and cat state
coding, as shown in Fig. 1. State preparation. Alice
(Bob) randomly chooses the Z and X bases with prob-
abilities pZ and pX . For the Z basis, Alice (Bob) ran-
domly prepares coherent state optical pulses |αa(b)〉 and
|−αa(b)〉 with equal probabilities for the logic bits 0 and
1. For the X basis, Alice (Bob) randomly prepares cat
state optical pulses |ξ+(αa(b))〉 and |ξ−(αa(b))〉 with equal
probabilities for the logic bits 0 and 1. Entanglement
measurement. Alice and Bob send the optical pulses to
the untrusted Charlie through insecure quantum channel
with efficiency ηa and ηb (with detector efficiency taken
into account). Charlie is supposed to perform the ECS
measurement. For example, he let the two optical pulses
interfere in the symmetric BS which would be detected
by two threshold detectors L and R. Announcement.
Charlie publicly discloses whether he has obtained a suc-
cessful measurement result and which ECS is acquired.
Alice and Bob only keep the data of successful measure-
ment and discard the rest. Reconciliation. Alice and
Bob announce their bases over an authenticated classi-
cal channel. They only keep the data of the same basis
and discard the rest. For the Z basis, Bob flips his key
bit if Charlie announces a result with |Ψ−〉. For the X
basis, Bob always flips his key bit. Parameter estima-
tion. The data of the Z basis are used for constituting
raw key and calculating the gain QZ and quantum bit
error rate (QBER) EZ of the Z basis. The data of the X
basis are all announced to calculate QBER EX of the X
basis. Key distillation. Alice and Bob exploit the error
correction and privacy amplification to distill secret key.
Here, we prove that coherent-state-based TF-QKD
with coherent state and cat state coding is secure
against coherent attacks in the asymptotic regime. Any
one of two successful detections is enough for prov-
ing the security. The coherent-state-based TF-QKD
can be regarded as a time-reversed entanglement pro-
tocol, where Alice and Bob prepare maximally entangled
state |ψ〉a′a =
( |+z〉a′ |αa〉a(b) + |−z〉a′ |−αa〉a )/√2 and
|ψ〉b′b =
( |+z〉b′ |αb〉b + |−z〉b′ |−αb〉b )/√2, respectively.
|±z〉 are the eigenstates of Pauli’s Z operator. Alice and
Bob keep the qubit and send the optical mode to Charlie,
who is supposed to perform entanglement swapping via
the ECS measurement. Thereby, the bipartite states be-
tween Alice and Bob have quantum correlation through
Charlie’s entanglement swapping operation. One can
use the entanglement purification technique [38] to dis-
till maximally entangled state and generate the secret
key. If Alice and Bob measure qubits before sending
optical pulses in the virtual entanglement protocol, it
will become the prepare-and-measurement protocol, i.e.,
coherent-state-based TF-QKD. Details can be found in
supplemental material. The efficient QKD scheme [43]
can be directly applied, where we let pZ ≈ 1 in the
asymptotic limit. The secret key rate of our coherent-
state-based TF-QKD with one-way classical communica-
tion [39] in the asymptotic limit is
R = QZ [1− fh(EZ)− h(EX)], (2)
where h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the
Shannon entropy and f = 1.16 is the error correction
efficiency. In our simulation, without Charlie’s distur-
bance, we have gain QZ = (1 − pd)[1 − (1 − 2pd)e−2x],
QBERs EZ = (1−pd)[edZ (1−e−2x)+pde−2x] and EX =
1
2{1 + e−2(µa+µb)[1 − (1 − 2pd)e2x]/[1− (1− 2pd)e−2x]},
where x = µaηa = µbηb, edZ is the misalignment rate of
the Z basis and pd is the dark count rate. The misalign-
ment of the X basis can be neglected since Bob always
flips his bit.
Here, we exploit the two-way entanglement purifica-
tion [40] into our coherent-state-based TF-QKD proto-
col to increase transmission distance. Specifically, be-
fore implementing Key distillation step, Alice randomly
permutes all raw key bits and divides them into two
groups, Bob does the same. Alice and Bob compute a
3FIG. 2. The secret key rate under symmetric channel. a (b), The misalignment of the Z basis is edZ = 3% (10%). Protocols
1 and 2 denote our protocol and the protocol proposed in Refs. [18, 19] with three-intensity phase-randomized coherent state,
respectively. We optimize the intensity of coherent state in the Z basis for each transmission loss. The repeaterless bound [12]
is also shown in the figure.
parity on raw key of two groups and compare the par-
ities. The second group is always discarded. If their
parities are the same, they keep the bit of the first
group. Otherwise, they discard it. One can repeat the
above operation once for each B step. After kth B step
is applied, the gain, bit and phase error rates can be
given by QkZ =
1
2A
k−1Qk−1Z , E
k
Z =
(
Ek−1Z
)2
/Ak−1, and
EkX = 2E
k−1
X
(
1− Ek−1Z − Ek−1X
)
/Ak−1, where we have
Ak−1 =
(
1− Ek−1Z
)2
+
(
Ek−1Z
)2
, Q0Z = QZ , E
0
Z = EZ
and E0X = EX . The secret key rate of our coherent-
state-based TF-QKD after kth B step in the asymptotic
limit is
Rk = QkZ [1− fh(EkZ)− h(EkX)]. (3)
Converting to other protocols. Without loss of gen-
erality, let positive-operator valued measure E10 and
E01 (Es = E10 + E01) denote the successful measure-
ment results with ECSs |Φ−〉 and |Ψ−〉; let Pˆ(|u, v〉) :=
|u〉 〈u| ⊗ |v〉 〈v| with |u, v〉 = |u〉 |v〉. The density ma-
trix of the Z and X bases are ρZ =
1
4 [Pˆ(|αa, αb〉) +
Pˆ(|αa,−αb〉) + Pˆ(|−αa, αb〉) + Pˆ(|−αa,−αb〉)] and
ρX =
1
4 [Pˆ(|ξ+(αa), ξ+(αb)〉) + Pˆ(|ξ+(αa), ξ−(αb)〉) +
Pˆ(|ξ−(αa), ξ+(αb)〉) + Pˆ(|ξ−(αa), ξ−(αb)〉)], where we
have ρX ≡ ρZ = ρ. For the cases of |ξ+(αa), ξ+(αb)〉
and |ξ−(αa), ξ−(αb)〉, they always generate the error
gain since Bob always flips his bit, and the correspond-
ing density matrix is ρEX =
1
4 [Pˆ(|ξ+(αa), ξ+(αb)〉) +
Pˆ(|ξ−(αa), ξ−(αb)〉)]. Let QX and QEX represent the gain
and error gain of the X basis. In the case of asymp-
totic limit, we always have QX ≡ QZ = Tr(ρEs) and
QEX = Tr(ρ
E
XEs). Therefore, the QBER EX (phase er-
ror rate of the Z basis) in the asymptotic limit can be
given by EX = Q
E
X/QX = Q
E
X/QZ. If one can acquire
an upper bound of QEX , the QBER EX can be bounded.
By using the entanglement purification with one-
way [38, 39] and two-way [40] classical communication
to prove security, we only require the estimation of the
QBER EX . This means that we do not need to pre-
pare cat state if we can acquire the QBER EX through
alternative method. The alternative method need to en-
sure that the prepared state by Alice (Bob) is linearly
dependent, which cannot allow Charlie to implement
unambiguous-state-discrimination attack [44] before per-
forming the entanglement swapping. Here, we show that
our protocol can be converted to the coherent-state-based
protocols of Refs. [14, 18–20] by using our security proof.
For the protocol proposed in Ref. [20], Alice and Bob
randomly prepare coherent state |eiθa√µa〉 and |eiθb√µb〉
if they choose the X basis, where they need phases
θa(b) ∈ [0, 2pi) and infinite intensities µa(b). As pointed
out in Ref. [20], the operator ρEX can be approximated
to arbitrary precision in the Hilbert-Schmidt norm by
the discrete diagonal coherent state representation ρEX =∑∞
i=1 λiPˆ(|ωia, ωib〉), where |ωia, ωib〉 is the tensor product
of coherent state and λi is complex number. Thereby,
the error gain QEX can be precisely obtained by using
coherent states with infinite intensities. Indeed, in the
ideal situation with symmetric channel, µ = µa = µb
and η = ηa = ηb, the secret key rate of this protocol by
using our security proof with one-way classical communi-
cation is given by R = (1 − e−µη)
[
1− h
(
1−e−4µ+2µη
2
)]
,
which is the same with the results of Ref. [20].
For the protocol proposed in Refs. [18, 19], Alice
and Bob randomly prepare phase-randomized coherent
state if they choose the X basis. As pointed out in
Ref [18, 19], by using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we
can bound the error gain QEX with photon-number state,
i.e., QEX = Tr(ρ
E
XEs) ≤
(∑∞
n,m=0
√
P a2nP
b
2mY2n,2m
)2
+(∑∞
n,m=0
√
P a2n+1P
b
2m+1Y2n+1,2m+1
)2
. Yn,m is the yield
given that Alice and Bob send n and m photon states
and P
a(b)
n = e−µa(b)µna(b)/n!. Decoy-state method [45–47]
can be used to estimate the yield Yn,m, which has been
4FIG. 3. The secret key rate under asymmetric channel. We
optimize the intensity for each transmission loss. The re-
peaterless bound [12] is also shown in the figure.
realized with finite intensities [18, 48]. Here, we use the
three-intensity, 0 < ω < ν, to estimate the yield, which
can be found in Methods.
For the protocol proposed in Ref. [14], Alice and Bob
always prepare the coherent state |ei(θa+κapi)√µa〉 and
|ei(θb+κbpi)√µb〉, where κa(b) ∈ {0, 1} and θa(b) ∈ [0, 2pi).
They keep the raw key bit only if |θa − θb| = 0 or
pi. As pointed out in Ref [14], one can introduce a
virtual trusted party who prepares a state, splits it using
symmetric BS, and sends it to both Alice and Bob.
We have the following observations Pˆ(|α〉) + Pˆ(|−α〉) =
Pˆ(|ξ+(α)〉) + Pˆ(|ξ−(α)〉) and Pˆ(|ξ+(√2α), 0〉) +
Pˆ(|0, ξ+(√2α)〉) BS−−→Pˆ(|ξ+(α), ξ+(α)〉)+Pˆ(|ξ−(α), ξ−(α)〉).
For the post-selected phase-matching, the error gain can
be given by QEX =
∑∞
n=0 e
−2µ(2µ)2nY2n/(2n)!, where
we need to assume µa = µb = µ. Yn is the yield given
that the total photon number sent by Alice and Bob is
n. Only even photon numbers have contribution to the
phase error rate in our security proof which is only the
same with the results of Ref. [14] in the ideal situation.
Different from protocols of ours and Refs. [18–20],
the protocol of Ref. [14] seems to be only suitable for
symmetric channel.
DISCUSSION
For simulation, we use the following parameters. The
inherent loss of fiber is 0.16 dB/km, the efficiency and
dark count rate of threshold single-photon detector are
ηd = 85% and pd = 10
−7. For simplicity, we let Protocol
1 represent our coherent state and cat state coding proto-
col. Let Protocol 2 represent the protocol in Ref. [18, 19]
with three-intensity phase-randomized coherent state.
Here, we fix the intensities of phase-randomized coher-
ent state with ν = 0.1 and ω = 0.02. The secret key rate
of our protocol is equal to that of protocol in Ref. [20]
since cat state can be approximated to arbitrary preci-
sion in the Hilbert-Schmidt norm by the discrete diago-
nal coherent state representation [20]. The performance
of Protocols 1 and 2 under symmetric channel have been
shown in Fig. 2, which assumes 1 GHz system repeti-
tion rate [23]. Here, we do not consider the performance
of protocols in Ref. [14], whose secret key rate has been
shown lower than protocols in Refs. [18–20]. The se-
cret key rate and transmission distance of Protocol 1 are
both superior to Protocol 2. The transmission distance
of Protocols 1 and 2 can both be improved by using the
two-way classical communication. Especially, the advan-
tages are very clear when the system misalignment rate is
large, like edZ = 10%. The large system misalignment of
TF-QKD is reasonable since the phase-locking and long-
distance phase stabilization techniques in field are still
difficult even with some experimental progresses [23–26].
The performance of Protocols 1 and 2 under asymmetric
channel have been shown in Fig. 3. The secret key rate of
Protocol 1 can still surpass the repeaterless bound when
the asymmetric channel ratio is 70%. The asymmetric
channel ratio is the ratio between A-C and A-B, where
A-C (B) represents the distance between Alice and Char-
lie (Bob). Compare Figs. 2 with 3, the performance of
coherent-state-based TF-QKD is the best under symmet-
ric channel due to the single-photon-type interference.
In summary, we propose a coherent-state-based TF-
QKD with optimal secret key rate by using coherent state
and cat state coding. By using the ECS measurement as
the entanglement swapping operation, we unify all known
coherent-state-based TF-QKD protocols under a single
framework. We have proved that the coherent-state-
based TF-QKD is a time-reversed entanglement protocol,
which means that one can use the known techniques of
qubit-based QKD to further develop the coherent-state-
based TF-QKD. The results show that coherent-state-
based TF-QKD is suitable for building quantum commu-
nication networks within hundreds of kilometers without
trusted relay or quantum repeater. We remark that cat
states used for high-speed QKD will have difficulty un-
der current experimental conditions. However, current
experiments on the demonstration of various quantum
tasks with cat states are very active [33–37], implying
that cat states may become a practical resource with the
rapid development of technology.
METHODS
Decoy-state analysis. The phase-randomized coher-
ent state can be seen as a mixture of Fock states. Let
Qa,b represent the gain when Alice and Bob send phase-
randomized coherent state with intensity a and b, re-
spectively. Let Yn,m represent the yield when Alice
and Bob send n-photon and m-photon. Thereby, we
have Qa,b =
∑∞
n=0
∑∞
m=0 e
−a−b anbm
n!m! Yn,m. Here, we ex-
ploit the decoy-state method with three-intensity to esti-
mate the upper bound of the yield Yn,m with analytical
method. The upper bound of Y1,1, Y0,2 and Y2,0 can be
5given by
Y1,1 ≤ e
2ωQω,ω − eω(Qω,0 +Q0,ω) +Q0,0
ω2
, (4)
Y0,2 ≤ ωe
νQ0,ν − νeωQ0,ω + (ν − ω)Q0,0
νω(ν − ω)/2 , (5)
and
Y2,0 ≤ ωe
νQν,0 − νeωQω,0 + (ν − ω)Q0,0
νω(ν − ω)/2 , (6)
where we have Y0,0 = Q0,0. The upper bound of Y0,n and
Yn,0 with n ≥ 3 can be written as
Y0,n ≤ min
{
1,
ωeνQ0,ν − νeωQ0,ω + (ν − ω)Q0,0
νω(νn−1 − ωn−1)/n!
}
,
(7)
and
Yn,0 ≤ min
{
1,
ωeνQν,0 − νeωQω,0 + (ν − ω)Q0,0
νω(νn−1 − ωn−1)/n!
}
.
(8)
Let Fx,y = e
x+yQx,y− exQx,0− eyQ0,y+Q0,0, the upper
bound of Y1,n and Yn,1 with n ≥ 2 can be given by
Y1,n ≤ min
{
1,
ωFω,ν − νFω,ω
(νnω2 − νωn+1)/n!
}
, (9)
and
Yn,1 ≤ min
{
1,
ωFν,ω − νFω,ω
(νnω2 − νωn+1)/n!
}
. (10)
Similarly, the upper bound of Yn,m with n,m ≥ 2 can be
given by
Yn,m ≤min
{
1,
ω2Fν,ν − νω(Fν,ω + Fω,ν) + ν2Fω,ω
ν2ω2(νn−1 − ωn−1)(νm−1 − ωm−1)/n!m!
}
.
(11)
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7SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 1: HERALDED ENTANGLEMENT GENERATION
The four two-mode entangled coherent states (ECSs) [1] can be written in different forms
|Φ±〉 = 1√
N±
(|α〉 |α〉 ± |−α〉 |−α〉) = 1√
N±
(|ξ+(α)〉 |ξ±(α)〉+ |ξ−(α)〉 |ξ∓(α)〉)
=
1√
N±
(|ξ+i(α)〉 |ξ∓i(α)〉+ |ξ−i(α)〉 |ξ±i(α)〉) ,
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
N±
(|α〉 |−α〉 ± |−α〉 |α〉) = 1√
N±
(|ξ±(α)〉 |ξ+(α)〉 − |ξ∓(α)〉 |ξ−(α)〉)
=
1
i
√
N±
(|ξ±i(α)〉 |ξ+i(α)〉 − |ξ∓i(α)〉 |ξ−i(α)〉) ,
(12)
where the parameters N± = 2(1 ± e−4µ) are the normalization factors. The quantum states |±α〉 are the coherent
states containing µ = |α|2 photons on average. The quantum states |ξ±(α)〉 = (|α〉 ± |−α〉)/√2 and |ξ±i(α)〉 =
(|α〉 ± i |−α〉)/√2 are the non-normalized single-mode cat states. Considering a lossless and symmetric beam splitter
(BS), the evolution of four ECSs after passing through the BS can be given by
|Φ+〉ab
BS
GGGGGGGA
2e−µ√
N+
∞∑
n=0
(
√
2α)2n√
(2n)!
|2n〉a˜ |0〉b˜ =⇒ |even〉a˜ |0〉b˜ ,
|Φ−〉ab
BS
GGGGGGGA
2e−µ√
N−
∞∑
n=0
(
√
2α)2n+1√
(2n+ 1)!
|2n+ 1〉a˜ |0〉b˜ =⇒ |odd〉a˜ |0〉b˜ ,
|Ψ+〉ab
BS
GGGGGGGA
2e−µ√
N+
∞∑
n=0
(
√
2α)2n√
(2n)!
|0〉a˜ |2n〉b˜ =⇒ |0〉a˜ |even〉b˜ ,
|Ψ−〉ab
BS
GGGGGGGA
2e−µ√
N−
∞∑
n=0
(
√
2α)2n+1√
(2n+ 1)!
|0〉a˜ |2n+ 1〉b˜ =⇒ |0〉a˜ |odd〉b˜ .
(13)
In the virtual entanglement-based protocol, the entangled state prepared by Alice can be written as
|ψ〉a′a =
1√
2
(|+z〉a′ |α〉a + |−z〉a′ |−α〉a)
=
1√
2
(|+x〉a′ |ξ+(α)〉a + |−x〉a′ |ξ−(α)〉a)
=
1√
2
(|+y〉a′ |ξ−i(α)〉a + |−y〉a′ |ξ+i(α)〉a) ,
(14)
and the entangled state prepared by Bob can be written as
|ψ〉b′b =
1√
2
(|+z〉b′ |α〉b + |−z〉b′ |−α〉b)
=
1√
2
(|+x〉b′ |ξ+(α)〉b + |−x〉b′ |ξ−(α)〉b)
=
1√
2
(|+y〉b′ |ξ−i(α)〉b + |−y〉b′ |ξ+i(α)〉b) ,
(15)
where qubit states |±z〉, |±x〉 and |±y〉 are the eigenstates of Pauli’s Z, X and Y operators. The bipartite qubit
entanglement states ρa′b′ between Alice and Bob are generated by using the event-ready detection to implement
upon the flying optical pulses, called entanglement swapping. Once Alice and Bob share qubit entanglement states
ρa′b′ even with noise, they can exploit most previous security proof techniques to obtain secret key. Here, we use
the entanglement purification techniques [2–4] to prove the security of our protocols against coherent attacks in the
asymptotic regime.
8SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 2: ENTANGLEMENT PURIFICATION AND SECURITY PROOF
OF QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
Here we review the entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) of bipartite qubit systems and its relation with the
security proof of quantum key distribution (QKD). In the work of Bennett, Divincenzo, smolin and Wooters (BDSW)
[5], it was shown that any bipartite qubit system density matrix can always be transformed into a diagonal form by
local operations and classical communication. The diagonal forms of density matrix are in the Bell states:
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|+z〉 |+z〉+ |−z〉 |−z〉),
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|+z〉 |+z〉 − |−z〉 |−z〉),
|ψ3〉 = 1√
2
(|+z〉 |−z〉+ |−z〉 |+z〉),
|ψ4〉 = 1√
2
(|+z〉 |−z〉 − |−z〉 |+z〉).
(16)
By using the argument of BDSW [5], the density matrix ρ describing Alice and Bob’s qubit systems can be regarded
as a classical mixture of the Bell states
ρ = λ1 |ψ1〉 〈ψ1|+ λ2 |ψ2〉 〈ψ2|+ λ3 |ψ3〉 〈ψ3|+ λ4 |ψ4〉 〈ψ4| , (17)
normalized with
∑4
i=1 λi = 1. If we let |ψ1〉 be the reference state, the parameters λ1, λ2, λ3 and λ4 represent
the probabilities of applying the Pauli I, Z, X and Y operators to either one of the qubit of the bipartite systems.
Therefore, the parameters λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 are the probabilities of no error, only phase flip error, only bit flip error, both
bit and phase flip errors, respectively. The hashing method and recurrence method have been proposed to implement
the EDP in the BDSW argument [5] if the density matrix is Bell-diagonal. The job of EDP is to distill almost perfect
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs from the shared noise EPR pairs by using the local operations and classical
communication to correct the bit and phase errors.
Due to the monogamy of entanglement, the eavesdropper’s system almost has no quantum correlation with the
system shared by Alice and Bob if they share nearly perfect pure EPR pairs. Therefore, Alice and Bob can measure
the EPR pairs with the same basis to acquire the secret key while the leaked information is negligible. An important
conclusion obtained in the Lo-Chau security proof [2] is that the general state (highly entangled between different
pairs) brings no advantage over a mixture of products of Bell states for the eavesdropper. It successfully reduces the
quantum (joint) coherent attack to classical collective attack, which means that eavesdropper’s probability of cheating
successfully is negligible and the extracted secret key of QKD is secure against all possible attacks by using the EDP.
A drawback of the Lo-Chau security proof is the requirement of quantum computer to implement the quantum error
correction (bit and phase errors). The distillation rate of EPR pairs with one-way EDP [5] in the asymptotic limit is
r = 1− h(eb)−H(ep|eb), (18)
where h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the Shannon entropy. The conditional Shannon entropy H(ep|eb) is
given by [6]
H(ep|eb) =− (1 + a− eb − ep) log2
1 + a− eb − ep
1− eb
− (ep − a) log2
ep − a
1− eb − (eb − a) log2
eb − a
eb
− a log2
a
eb
.
(19)
where eb = λ3 + λ4 is bit error rate , ep = λ2 + λ4 is phase error rate and a = λ4 quantifies the mutual information
between bit and phase errors. If the parameter a = ebep, one has H(ep|eb) = h(ep), which indicates no mutual
information between bit and phase errors.
The entanglement-based QKD can be reduced to prepare-and-measure protocol by exploiting the Calderbank-Shor-
Steane (CSS) error correction code in the Shor-Preskill security proof [3]. One can decouple the phase error correction
from the bit error correction in the CSS error correction code. Once Alice and Bob estimate the bit and phase error
rates, they can choose appropriate CSS code to correct all the bit and phase errors. The phase error rate estimation
method is arbitrary (direct measurement in the X basis is not necessary). The final measurement, such as the Z
basis, can be moved to the beginning since the Z measurement commutes with other steps if we remove the phase
error correction. Therefore, the quantum bit error correction can be replaced by classical bit error correction while
9the quantum phase error correction can be replaced by classical privacy amplification. For the BB84 encoding [7]
with the Z and X bases, the secret key rate of the Z basis with one-way classical communication in the Shor-Preskill
security proof [3] is
rBB84 = 1− h(ez)− h(ex), (20)
where ez = eb and ex = ep are the quantum bit error rates (QBERs) of the Z and X bases. The parameter a
can be set to ebep in the BB84 encoding since there is no restriction on a (0 ≤ a ≤ min(eb, ep)), which means that
there is no mutual information for the worst-case scenario. The six-state [8] encoding QKD with one-way classical
communication is proved by Lo [9], the corresponding secret key rate of the Z basis is
rsix-state = 1− h(ez)−H(ex|ez), (21)
where mutual information parameter a = (ez+ex−ey)/2 exploiting the QBER of the Y basis is ey = λ2+λ3. One can
acquire the mutual information by using the extra Y basis which means that the tolerant noise of six-state encoding
is higher than the BB84 encoding.
Compared with the one-way EDP, the two-way EDP proposed by Gottesman and Lo [4] has shown an advantage
in tolerating noise. Except for the final random hashing used in one-way EDP, there are another two types of steps,
B step and P step, in the Gottesman-Lo security proof [4]. The B and P steps are used for decreasing the bit and
phase error rates, respectively. Then the key can be extracted by applying random hashing. This is the reason why
Gottesman-Lo’s two-way EDP is able to tolerate more noise.
Definition of B step. Alice and Bob perform a bilateral XOR operation on two EPR pairs and compare the
measurement results of target pairs in the Z basis after they randomly permute all the EPR pairs and divide them
into two EPR pairs, control pairs and target pairs. The bilateral XOR measurement is used to detect the single
bit error. It means that the measurement result is the same (different) given that the two EPR pairs have no bit
error or both have a bit error (only one of the two EPR pairs has bit error). If the measurement outcomes are the
same, they keep the control qubit; otherwise, they discard it. The B step requires two-way classical communication
to change information between Alice and Bob. The B step is compatible with the prepare-and-measure protocol since
the bilateral XOR operation of B step is equivalent to two measurement of Z ⊗ Z. If we assume that the noise EPR
pairs are characterized by {eb, ep, a}, the new state is characterized by {e˜b, e˜p, a˜} [4] after one B step is applied,
e˜b =
e2b
(1 − eb)2 + e2b
,
e˜p =
2(1− eb − ep + a)(ep − a) + 2a(eb − a)
(1− eb)2 + e2b
,
a˜ =
2a(eb − a)
(1 − eb)2 + e2b
,
(22)
where psB = [(1 − eb)2 + e2b ]/2 is the probability of survival EPR pairs after one B step. The factor 1/2 stems from
the fact that only half of the initial EPR pairs are control pairs. For the BB84 encoding, a is a freedom parameter
0 ≤ a ≤ min(eb, ep), the worst case of B or P steps is a = 0 in the two-way EDP proved by Gottesman and Lo [4],
which is different from the one-way EDP [3] with a = ebep.
Definition of P step. Alice and Bob randomly permute all EPR pairs and divide them into three groups, one target
and two control EPR pairs. They perform two bilateral XOR on three EPR pairs by one target and two control pairs.
By measuring the two control pairs in the X basis and comparing the measurement results, they can find the phase
error syndrome. However, the phase error cannot be detected and corrected in the prepare-and-measure protocol.
The P step is reduced to implement the classical XOR operation among the three bits to generate one bit in the
prepare-and-measure protocol if the Z basis measurement is performed before the P step. Therefore, if we assume
that the noise EPR pairs are characterized by {eb, ep, a}, the new EPR pairs are characterized by {e˜b, e˜p, a˜} [4] after
one P step is implemented,
e˜b = 3eb(1− eb)2 + e3b ,
e˜p = 3e
2
p(1− ep) + e3p,
a˜ = 3a(ep − a)(2− 2eb − ep + a) + 3(eb − a)[a2 + (ep − a)2] + a3,
(23)
where psP = 1/3 is the probability of survival EPR pairs after one P step since only one-third (target pairs) of the
initial EPR pairs are remained.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 3: SIMULATION MODEL
Similarly to the simulation of traditional QKD, we consider the case without eavesdropper’s disturbance. Here, we
consider that the quantum channel is a pure loss model which is similar with BS. The evolution of Fock state |n〉,
coherent state |α〉 and cat state after passing through the channel can be given by
|n〉
channel
GGGGGGGGGGGGA
n∑
m=0
√
Cmn η
m
t (1− ηt)n−m |m〉T |n−m〉R = |φ(n)〉 ,
|α〉
channel
GGGGGGGGGGGGA |α√ηt〉T |α
√
1− ηt〉R ,
|α〉 ± |−α〉
channel
GGGGGGGGGGGGA |α√ηt〉T |α
√
1− ηt〉R ± |−α
√
ηt〉T |−α
√
1− ηt〉R = |ψ〉 ,
(24)
where Cmn is the binomial coefficient and ηt is the transmittance of channel. The modes T and R will keep in the
channel and couple to the environment, respectively. Therefore, the kept quantum states in the channel will be
ρT(|n〉) = TrR (|φ(n)〉 〈φ(n)|) =
n∑
m=0
Cmn η
m
t (1− ηt)n−m |m〉T 〈m| ,
ρT(|α〉) = TrR
(
|α√ηt〉T 〈α
√
ηt| |α
√
1− ηt〉R 〈α
√
1− ηt|
)
= |α√ηt〉T 〈α
√
ηt| ,
ρT(|α〉 ± |−α〉) = TrR (|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = |α√ηt〉T 〈α
√
ηt|+ |−α√ηt〉T 〈−α
√
ηt| ± e−2µ(1−ηt)(|α√ηt〉T 〈−α
√
ηt|+ |−α√ηt〉T 〈α
√
ηt|),
(25)
After passing through the channel, the Fock state |n〉 will become the mixed Fock state with m (0 ≤ m ≤ n) photons
while the coherent state is still a coherent state containing µηt photons on average. The detection operation of
threshold detector can be characterized by two measurement operators, click F c and no click Fnc,
F c =
∞∑
n=0
[1− (1− pd)(1− ηd)n] |n〉 〈n| ,
Fnc = I − F c =
∞∑
n=0
(1− pd)(1− ηd)n |n〉 〈n| ,
(26)
where I = Σ∞n=0 |n〉 〈n| is the identity operator, pd and ηd are the dark count rate and efficiency of detector, respectively.
After some calculation, the correct gain QCZ and error gain Q
E
Z of the Z basis with coherent state coding can be
written as
QCZ = (1− pd)[1 − (1− pd)e−µaηa−µaηb ],
QEZ = pd(1− pd)e−µaηa−µaηb ,
(27)
where µaηa = µbηb, ηa(b) = ηdηat(bt), ηat(bt) = 10
−βLac(bc)/10, β is the the intrinsic loss coefficient of fiber channel and
Lac(bc) is the distance between Alice and Charlie (Bob and Charlie). Similarly, the correct gain Q
C
X and error gain
QEX of the X basis with cat state coding can be written as
QCX =
1− pd
2
[
1− e−2µa−2µb − (1 − 2pd)(e−µaηa−µbηb − e−2µa−2µb+µaηa+µbηb)
]
,
QEX =
1− pd
2
[
1 + e−2µa−2µb − (1 − 2pd)(e−µaηa−µbηb + e−2µa−2µb+µaηa+µbηb)
]
.
(28)
Thereby, the total gain of the Z basis, the QBERs of the Z basis EZ and the X basis EX can be given by
QZ = Q
C
Z +Q
E
Z ,
EZ = [edZQ
C
Z + (1− edZ )QEZ ]/QZ ,
EX = Q
E
X/(Q
C
X +Q
E
X) = Q
E
X/QZ ,
(29)
where edZ is the misalignment rate of the Z basis.
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For the protocol in Ref. [10, 11] with phase-randomized coherent state |eiθa√νa〉a |eiθb
√
νb〉b, the corresponding gain
can be given by
Qνaνb = 2(1− pd)e−
1
2 (νaηa+νbηb)I0(
√
νaηaνbηb)− 2(1− pd)2e−(νaηa+νbηb), (30)
where I0(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind and I0(0) = 1. The density matrix of the phase-randomized
coherent state is
ρ =
1
4pi2
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
|eiθa√νa〉 〈eiθa√νa| |eiθb√νb〉 〈eiθb√νb| dθadθb
= e−(νa+νb)
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
νna ν
m
b
n!m!
|n〉 〈n| |m〉 〈m| ,
(31)
which is the mixture of Fock states. Let yield Yn,m denote the detection probability when Alice and Bob send Fock
states with n and m photons, respectively. Therefore, the gain with intensities νa and νb can be represented by
Qνaνb = e
−(νa+νb)
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
νna ν
m
b
n!m!
Yn,m. (32)
The yield Yn,m can be written as
Yn,m =
n∑
k=0
m∑
l=0
{
CknC
l
mη
k
atη
l
bt(1− ηat)n−k(1− ηbt)m−l
k+l∑
u=0
{
u!(k + l − u)!
2k+lk!l!
[
l∑
v=0
(−1)l−vCvl Cu−vk
]2
× {[1− (1 − pd)(1 − ηd)u](1 − pd)(1 − ηd)k+l−u + (1− pd)(1 − ηd)u [1− (1− pd)(1− ηd)k+l−u]}
}}
,
(33)
which can be precisely obtained by exploiting the decoy-state method [12–14] with infinite intensities. However, the
tight analytical method has been provided in main text by using the three-intensity with 0 < ω < ν.
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